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RELIGIOUS CHILDREN AND THE
INEVITABLE COMPULSION OF PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
Stanley Ingber*
As Professor George Dent notes, most religious objections to
public education emanate from religious traditionalists' representing
their general disenchantment with public school curricula2 and their
insistence that their children have a right to partake in public edu-
cation without being forced to confront - or perhaps accept -
the alien dogma of secularism.3 Generally, these claims have three
* James Madison Chair in Constitutional Law, Drake Umversity. B.A. 1969, Brooklyn
College; J.D. 1972, Yale Law School.
1. George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public
School Students, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 707, 708 (1993).
2. See Mark G. Yudof, Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for
the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. Li. 527, 538 (1984) (Parents view schoolbooks as re-
flecting secular values that conflict sharply with fundamental religious beliefs.).
3. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text. Of course, even though all states
since 1918 have required children within a specified age group to attend school, ROBERT
M. O'NEIL, CLASSROOMS IN THE CROSSFIRE 59 (1981), parents have a constitutional right
to send their children to private, parochial schools. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that the State may not "standardize its children by forc-
ing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." However, such an option, as
Professor Dent asserts, may have little significance for a parent who cannot afford pnvate
education. Dent, supra note 1, at 722, 728.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has occasionally interpreted the Free Exercise Clause
to forbid conditioning participation in a public program upon the relinquishment of reli-
gious liberties. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1963) (holding that pay-
ment of state unemployment benefits could not be demed a Seventh Day Adventist who
refused to work on Saturday); but see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-85
(1990) (holding that payment of state unemployment benefits could be demed where appli-
cant was distrssed from employment due to sacramental use of peyote). In one case a
religious claimant argued: "It is a clear-cut denial of the [Free [E]xercise
[C]lause to effectively exclude religious children from the public schools as a price
of maintainng their religious beliefs." Michael Silence, A Dental of Religious Freedom?
NAT-L L.J., Oct. 13, 1986, at 6 (quoting plaintiff's attorney in Mozert v. Hawkins County
Pub. Sch., 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), revd sub nom. Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066
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components: a fear that a "godless" school may undermine home
and church religious teachmg,4 an apprehension of open conflict
between what is taught in school about the origin of life and what
is presented at home as the literal word of God, and a concern that
children under peer and teacher pressure will espouse beliefs con-
trary to those instilled by parents and religious leaders.'
These fears and apprehensions are especially pronounced in
communities where the school curriculum includes "character edu-
cation" 6 or "critical learning"7 and where cultural values are not
uniformly held." In such circumstances, the grounds for religious
(1988)).
4. There is an iromc twist to the fundamentalist attack on a "godless" curriculum.
Many textbooks and teachers steer clear of religious references precisely to avoid the
wrath of fundamentalist groups or parents who find the specific religious portrayal offen-
sive. David Saperstem & Charles Bergstrom, Banning Textbooks Is Not the Answer,
GAINSEVLLE SUN, Mar. 21, 1987, at 13A.
5. These concerns are not unreasonable. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERC.AN CON-
STITUTONAL LAW § 14-5, at 1174-75 (2d ed. 1988) (Public schools carry state authority
and are inherently mculcative.). In many ways public schools are an indoctrinator's dream.
See Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 647 (1980) (identifying
several factors that enhance the power of government speech in elementary schools). Four
factors enhance the public school system's potential for indoctrination. First, attendance is
compulsory, and students lack the independent knowledge or psychological sophistication
necessary to evaluate critically what their teachers tell them. Second, public schools can
package their messages as highly valued "education" rather than as less trustworthy propa-
ganda. Third, the adult teacher's authority and seemingly vast fund of knowledge likely
will unpress the children. Finally, teachers reward and punish students according to how
well they learn the lesson of the day. Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: To-
wards a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TFX. L REV.
863, 875 (1979).
6. The attack on "character education" already illustrates the inescapable bind in
which public schools find themselves. If schools attempt to avoid exerting influence upon
students' attitudes, children may perceive an indifferent approach to various moral options
by the adult authority as indicating the intrinsic equality of all options and the arbitrari-
ness of choosing among them. Schools, then, are accused of encouraging a hedonistic -
anything goes - attitude. The addition of a "character education" component to the cur-
riculum often signifies an effort by schools, consistent with religious community demands,
to reject hedonism and instill within the child an appreciation for values and morals. In
so doing, however, schools are again condemned by religious groups for selecting and
supporting values inconsistent with those mandated by their religious beliefs. Conflict,
hence, appears unavoidable. See infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
7. Tius curricular goal, one court explained, "requires the development of higher order
cognitive skills that enable students to evaluate the matenal they read, to contrast the
ideas presented, and to understand complex characters that appear in reading material."
Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.
8. Where community members share common values, these curricular additions seldom
cause difficulties. Conflicts are mainly in communities experiencing cultural instability as
community-wide support for these values erodes. See Mark Tushnet, Free Expression and
the Young Adult: A Constitutional Framework, 1976 U. ILL L. REV. 746, 755 (stating
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concerns are substantial. Some faiths may require their adherents to
separate themselves from teachings and practices that conflict with
the tenets of their theology m order to avoid temptation or even
the appearance of a right to choose among competing perspectives,
some of which are religiously objectionable.9 State compulsion to
participate in a cumculum supporting or even simply proposing
religiously objectionable perspectives may undermine religious values.'
that litigated conflicts between teachers and school boards over what information students
should receive in school usually arise from cultural conflicts, such as when a new teacher
(i.e., an "outsider" to the community) is pitted against a rural school board).
Such fractured school communities are, in part, a legacy of the civil rights
movement's success in eroding school homogeneity. Court-ordered bussing and the rise of
magnet school systems have brought together children of differing cultural, economc, ra-
coal, and religious backgrounds within a single school that attempts to educate them all.
Much of the present conflict over curriculum arises when these various groups, accus-
tomed to controlling school decisions, discover they must now battle with each other to
"preserve, defend, or enhance [the] relative dominance and prestige" of their differing
beliefs. Stanley Ingber, Procedure, Ceremony and Rhetoric: The Minimization of Ideologi-
cal Conflict in Deviance Control, 56 B.U. L. REV. 266, 268-69, (1976). In such contexts,
when school officials support one group's claim, they implicitly favor that group's norma-
tive precepts over those of others in the school community. Id. at 269.
9. Later I will argue that the presumptions implicit in the scientific method of inquiry
may be antagonistic to the religious beliefs of some. See infra notes 31-36 and accom-
panying text.
10. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209-13, 215-19 (1972) (describing the
Amish faith and holding that compulsory schooling of Anush children would endanger
their right to free exercise of religion). Many faiths seem more psychologically sopisti-
cated than the law in appreciating the scope of this danger. The Supreme Court, at times,
has distinguished between the people's right to believe as they wish and the state's power
to compel behavior inconsistent with these beliefs. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990) (in holding that the state may deny unemployment benefits
to employees fired because of sacramental use of peyote, the Court distingushed between
regulating beliefs and regulating actions through generally applicable criminal law);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (holding that prohibition of biga-
my may be enforced against Mormons, and distinguishing between regulating beliefs and
regulating actions).
The psychological theory of cognitive dissonance, however, recognizes an inalienable
connection between action and belief. According to this theory, the tension created within
an individual by the conflict between belief and compelled mconsistent behavior is often
resolved by altering the belief system to make it accord with the required conduct. THE
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 93 (Rom Marre & Roger Lamb eds., 1983)
(The theory of cognitive dissonance "assumes that a person behaves in a way which will
maximize the internal consistency of his or her cognitive system Because disso-
nance is psychologically uncomfortable, its existence will motivate a person to reduce it
and aclueve consonance."); see, e.g., JACK W. BREIM & ARTHUR R. COHEN, EXPLORA-
TIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 41 (1962) (stating that forced compliance can cause a
subject's attitude toward a task to become more positive); LEON FESTiNGER, CONFLICT,
DECISION, AND DISSONANCE 155 (1964) (stating that once a person makes a decision, the
person becomes less objective about alternatives; the very fact of acting on one alternative
affects belief about those alternatives); ROBERT A. WICxLUND & JACK W. BREEM, PER-
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An analysis of the propriety of state compulsion traditionally
has been central to any understanding of claims surrounding the
Free Exercise Clause.11 This explains the seeming anomaly of a
symposium partially dedicated to discussing Free Exercise problems
by concentrating on a case, Lee v. Weisman,12 which ostensibly
involves Establishment Clause issues. Although declining invitations
of both the petitioner and the United States as amicus to reconsider
the standards posed by Lemon v. Kurtzman13 for evaluating Estab-
lishment Clause claims,14 the Supreme Court determined the con-
stitutional impropriety of a nondenominational prayer at a public
SPECTIVES ON COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 4-5 (1976) (stating that, for example, one who
votes for a candidate for political office despite knowing that the candidate is not very
intelligent might reduce his dissonance by convincing himself either that intelligence is not
a requirement of the office, or that the candidate is exceptionally honest); Russell I.
Fazio et al., Dissonance and Self-Perception: An Integrative View of Each Theory's Prop-
er Domain of Application and Locus of Control, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL.
464, 475 (1977) (reporting results of an experiment in which subjects were asked to write
an essay espousing an extreme political viewpoint, with the result that some subjects'
political self-perceptions shifted in the direction of the essay). Thus, the risk exists in the
secular school setting not only of creating a value clash but also of planting deeply unset-
tling doubts in a religious child's mind. See Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F.
Supp. 939, 945 (S.D. Ala.) (parent testifying that his religious children were experiencing
severe value conflicts and required daily doctrinal re-education), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (1th
Cir. 1987).
11. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSITITUTONAL LAW § 17.6, at
1209 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing the balancing test used by the Supreme Court between
1963 and 1989 in cases in which a person desired exemption, under the Free Exercise
Clause, from a law of general applicability: the test was triggered if the person could
show that the generally applicable law required her to act in violatiort of her religion).
Consequently, the Supreme Court has refused to include within the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause claims based on official conduct that, although significantly interfering
with religious practices, compelled neither belief nor action of the religious claimant. Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-53 (1988) (upholding
the government's right to use federal lands in a manner that irreparably damaged sacred
areas necessary for religious rituals of certain American Indians).
12. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
13. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon test, or perhaps better referred to as the Lemon
standards due to the tentative manner they have been applied by the Court, finds a chal-
lenged enactment invalid unless it (1) has a secular legislative purpose, (2) has no prima-
ry effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) avoida causing an excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
14. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
Although I appreciate Professor Michael Paulsen's conclusion that following
Weisman, the Lemon test has been eviscerated, Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 795, 797 (1993), I believe the interment to be premature. Until
the Supreme Court overrules Lemon explicitly, lower courts, familiar with the Lemon
criteria, are likely to continue to use them as "helpful signpost[s]" in dealing with Estab-
lishment Clause challenges. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (describing
the ongoing function of the Lemon standards).
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school graduation ceremony on the basis of what is essentially a
compulsion test 5 Consequently, in appraising the right of reli-
gious children to seek protection from public school curricula that
they, or their parents, 6 believe hostile to faith, Professor Dent
properly considers the type and degree of compulsion held by the
Court in Weisman to violate the Religion Clauses. 7
The majority opinion in Weisman explicitly recognized that
not only religious beliefs themselves but the methods by which
these beliefs are preserved and transmitted are "committed to the
private sphere" and insulated by both Religion Clauses from "gov-
ernment interference." s Additionally, in the context of elementary
and secondary schoolchildren, the Court accepted psychological
coercion in the form of public and peer pressure - "though subtle
and indirect""9 - as sufficient to mandate a "heightened con-
cernf with protecting freedom of conscience."20 Dent, although
initially approaching the Court's reasoning only with caution,21
thereafter insists a comparable standard of compulsion should apply
to Free Exercise clauns.22
Without considerable further clarification and fine-tuning, I
find this position untenable. For example, Professor Dent, while
admitting that Free Exercise claims are proper only when the be-
liefs infringed upon are religious in nature, 3 rejects as inevitably
discriminatory any objective standard of what is religious.24 He
reminds us that for fundamentalist sects "religion is pervasive -
[that] everything in their lives is religiously significant."25 Yet,
15. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 ("[A]t a nununum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate m religion or its exer-
cise ").
16. The potential distinction between the beliefs and rights of children and those of
their parents may have significant implications. See infa notes 70-71.
17. Dent, supra note 1, at 715.
18. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2656-57.
19. Id. at 2658.
20. Id.
21. Dent, supra note 1, at 715.
22. Id. at 718.
23. Id. at 726.
24. Id.
25. Id. Assumng such pervasive religiosity of some, may public schools embrace a
narrower view of religion and teach as secular that which members of one or more con-
stituent groups of the school community perceive as religious? Must schools accept the
most pervasive perspective or be accused of improperly endorsing one religious world-view
over another? Would compliance with that pervasive perspective not itself constitute such
an endorsement? See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) ('TIThe First
1993]
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26given the religious pluralism of Twentieth Century America,
were we to accept this perspective, school officials would need to
develop a value-free curriculum or at least attempt to present a
value-neutral or balanced presentation of alternative value posi-
tions.27 For overwhelming practical and conceptual reasons, these
options are implausible.28
I. THE INEVrrABILrry OF VALUE CONFLICT
A value-free currculum is clearly impossible. Selectivity is
inherent in making decisions of inclusion and exclusion necessary
to develop a cuMculum. 29 Curricular choices, therefore, inevitably
lend the color of official support to one perspective over another.
Additionally, pedagogical style and classroom procedure instill
through students' experience value positions on matters such as the
respect due authority, the value of independent or critical thinking,
and the respect due opposing opinions, as well as a multitude of
others.3"
Similarly, schools simply cannot attain value-neutral or bal-
anced education. With only limited resources and time, they cannot
possibly provide currcula that encompass the world's enormous
mass of information and perspectives. Furthermore, subtle charac-
teristics such as style and emphasis may undermine any substantive
success in achieving balanced presentations.31 Even if these practi-
Amendment does not permit the State to requre that teaching and learning must be tai-
lored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma."). These, and sm-
lar questions, are ignored by Professor Dent, yet their answers determine whether public
education can survive in light of his analysis. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying
text.
26. TREBE, supra note 5, § 14-6, at 1179; see also TE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
RELIGIONS (2d ed. 1987) (describing 1347 religious organizations).
27. At one point, Dent attempts to eschew any claim that he is arguing for value-free
or value-neutral education. Dent, supra note 1, at 735 ([E]ducation inevitably bolsters
some values and weakens others."). Given the totality of his analysis, however, I intend
to demonstrate that without such a claim his argument is incoherent. See infra text ac-
companying notes -57-65 & note 65 (arguing that Dent's analysis compels the conclusion
that even accommodation cannot bnng public education in line with the First
Amendment).
28. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
29. For example, how could one decide whether to include a course on "Marriage and
Family Living," or what the course should include, on a value-free basis?
30. As Marshall McLuhan wrote nearly tirty years ago, the medium may be the most
significant message. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF
MAN 13 (1964).
31. Would schools, for example, fulfill a mandate of value neutrality if they presented
[Vol. 43:773
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cal difficulties could be overcome, an insurmountable conceptual
problem remains: Value neutrality itself has a value bias favoring
the liberal philosophy embodied by the scientific method of mqul-
ry 32 According to this perspective, public schools should "fos-
ter habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry "33 Children
are to be exposed to various theories, points of view, and alterna-
tives for action m order to "develop their full potential or exercise
their sovereign right to govern themselves." '4 Value neutrality
thus is biased toward those value systems that are self-centered or
rest on consensual arrangements.35 In effect, value neutrality posits
individual criticism and moral choice as values unto themselves.
Consequently, a "value-neutral" education would conflict with
perspectives, such as fundamentalist Christianity, that advocate im-
posmg values.36
Upon reflection, therefore, public education inevitably mcul-
cates values.37 What then of religious individuals who claim the
all perspectives but allocated ten times more classroom time to one than to all others? On
the other hand, options that students can appreciate only after long-term study are obvi-
ously disadvantaged by a smorgasbord vision of neutrality that allocates equal time to all
perspectives.
32. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, ESSAYS IN SKEPTICISM 83 (1962) ("The question is how
to arrive at your opinions and not what your opinions are Mo my mid the es-
sential thing is that one should base one's arguments upon the land of grounds that are
accepted m science, and that one should not regard anything that one accepts as quite
certain, but only as probable m a greater or less degree.").
33. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, L, concurring); see
also Frederic S. Le Clereq, The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second Con-
sumption?, 27 VAND. L. REV. 209, 235 (1974) ("The primary function of the public
school should be to encourage students to develop an appropriate methodology for engag-
ing m intellectual inquiry.").
34. Thomas I. Emerson & David Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern Dress, 27 U.
CHI. L. REV. 522, 527 (1960) (calling for "balanced presentation" of competing theories).
35. On the other hand, religious precepts not only may prohibit the acceptance of
certain beliefs, but also may forbid even the suggestion that an option exists to choose
individually among beliefs. Not surprisingly, therefore, fundamentalist or traditionalist reli-
gious sects protest most strenuously against curricula perceived to promote perspectives
such as self-actualization and moral relativism. Ironically, schools may foster these per-
spectives precisely to avoid conveying a message of exclusion to any belief system, reli-
gious or otherwise, represented within the school community. In an effort to portray a
"broad tent" image - welcoming people of differing viewpoints - schools may conscien-
tiously avoid notions of fixed, enduring values. Yet these very efforts at "neutrality" may
be attacked by religious groups as encouraging a "moral relativism" inconsistent with their
religious tenets. The dilemma of public education is manifest.
36. Carried to its logical extreme, a commitment to the scientific method means that
teachers could discuss systems which impose values but could never present such systems
as viable options.
37. Tis realization transforms public schools into the stage for passionate struggles.
19931
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right to be unhampered in their religious beliefs or protected from
governmental inculcation of contrary beliefs? How are public
schools to function without impinging upon the rights rooted in the
Religion Clauses?
II. THE MEANING OF "RELIGIOUS"
The kernel of the answer to this dilemma is found in Justice
William J. Brennan's assertion that parents who entrust public
schools with the education of their children have the right to "con-
dition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not
purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict
with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family 38
The crucial term in this response is that schools may not advance
"religious views" Given the broad definition of compulsion offered
in Weisman,39 Professor Dent correctly asserts that "[ilt should
follow that virtually all activity in public schools involves
compulsion." 4 Thus, if public schools are to survive and the Reli-
gion Clauses are to have any significance, we must distinguish
between "religious" and "secular" beliefs. Dent argues, however,
that this distinction is either impossible because an objective def-
mition of religion itself is improper4 or irrelevant given that the
Supreme Court frequently has interpreted the Religion Clauses as
"demand[ing] governmental neutrality not only among different
religions, but also between religion and secularism."42
I disagree. Elsewhere I have contended that religion consists
of a "unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred
things" 43 - that it is the role played by the sacred or divine that
Recognizing that the value training of children invariably includes aspects of compulsion,
cumcular conflicts come down to battles over value perspectives among interested groups
seeking to preserve or expand their power. See Yudof, supra note 2, at 539-40 (describ-
ing the clash of interests in textbook values). Thus the real question in the public school
setting is the following: Which group, if any, should determine which values we inculcate
in our children? I explore this question more comprehensively in a previous work. See
Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy- Value Training
in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15.
38. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
39. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992) (holding that subtle, indirect
peer pressure is a form of compulsion).
40. Dent, supra note 1, at 715.
41. Id. at 726 (stating that an objective definition of religion would discrimnate
against minority sects); see supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
42. Dent, supra note 1, at 719 & n.79 (citing such interpretations).
43. Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Claus-
[V/ol. 43:773
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separates religious beliefs from secular ones for legal purposes.44
For religious duties to be perceived as unique, they must be based
in the "otherworldly"45 or the transcendent - transcendent not as
an abstract concept reachable only by reason and intellect is tran-
scendent, but a transcendent reality.46 It is the peculiar "otherness"
- the extraordinary, momentous, set-apart quality of sacred (or
taboo) acts and objects - that makes suspect any secular law
which interferes with divinely ordained responsibilities. 47 Human
beings may not undo an obligation not of human making.48
Despite the foregoing, certainly Professor Dent must be right.
Regardless of any distinction between the religious and the secular,
public schools surely cannot proselytize atheism without conflicting
with the Religion Clauses.49 Consequently, I contend a further dis-
es, 41 STAN L. REV. 233, 285 (1989) [hennafter Religion or Ideology] (quoting EMILE
DURmHEM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIE 62 (Joseph W. Swam
trans., 1965)). For the classic exposition of the idea of sacredness as the hallmark of
religious consciousness, see MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE 11 (Willard
R. Trask trans., 1959) ("[T]he history of religions is constituted by a great number
of luerophanies, by manifestations of sacred realities.") and RUDOLPH OTTO, THE IDEA OF
THE HOLY (John W. Harvey trans., 2d ed. 1950) ("'Holiness' - 'the holy' - is a cate-
gory of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion.").
44. This understanding of the religious is not necessarily bound by any theistic precept.
For example, four differing conceptions of the divine can be distinguished:
mhe divine as an impersonal, sacred order (Logos, Tao, rta, Asha) governing
the universe and man's destiny; the divine as power that is holy and must be
approached with awe, proper preparation, or ritual cleansing; the divine as all-
embracing One, the ultimate Unity and harmony of all finite realities and the
goal of the mystical quest; and the divine as an individual or self transcending
the world and man and yet standing in relation to both at the same time.
Sisirkumar Ghose, Religious Experience, in 26 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 578,
580 (Robert McHenry ed., 15th ed. 1992).
45. Refining the concept of religion as the sacred, theologian Rudolph Otto focuses on
the "wholly other" which is "beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the
familiar." OTTO, supra note 43, at 26.
46. This qualification is necessary to recognize the transcendent or sacred as an onto-
logical category distinguished from a .purely moral or philosophical concept. For the reli-
gious individual, "sacred" is a noun as well as an adjective. In a religion, the transcen-
dent force is real; it exists, even though on a plane beyond human senses. See ELiADE,
supra note 43, at 10 ("The sacred always manifests itself as a reality of a wholly differ-
ent order from 'natural' realities.").
47. Religious responsibilities may be communicated by divine word or through an
intermediary acting under divine guidance.
48. To the religious believer, one must refer to the divine or the transcendent in order
to satisfactorily understand the fundamental questions of life. George C. Freeman, MIT, The
Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion", 71 GEO. L.J 1519,
1555 (1983).
49. See Dent, supra note 1, at 719 n.79 ("Various versions of the religion clauses
were rejected by the framers to assuage the fears that the proposed amendments might
19931
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tinction must be drawn between irreligious secularism, which is
opposed or hostile to religion (defined as a belief system based on
the existence of the sacred or divine), and a nonreligious secular-
ism, for which the existence or nonexistence of religion is irrele-
vant.50 State promotion of u-religious secularism would be uncon-
stitutional; support of nonreligious secularism would not be."'
This proposed distinction, of course, is subject to attack. Argu-
ably, a systematic and pervasive indoctrination of nonreligious
perspectives undercuts religion. A system that either provides ex-
planations for all phenomena without reference to religion or that
teaches that there are no answers to our most compelling ques-
tions 2 effectively makes religion less necessary and hence less
believable. The nonreligious thus may be equated with the irreli-
gIous.
5 3
disfavor religion generally or even favor atheism."); see supra text accompanying note 42.
50. See Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding
of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CM. L. REV. 805, 811-15 (1978) (arguing
for the need to distinguish between the irreligious and the nonreligious). To illustrate, one
commentator described secularism as "independent of theistical or other doctrine" rather
than atheistic or antitheological. 2 GEORGE J. HOLYOAKE, SIXTY YEARS OF AN
AGITATOR'S LuF 293 (1892).
51. Merel, supra note 50, at 821 (MThe [E]stablishment [Clause is properly construed
as prohibiting all laws respecting establishment of any one religious or irreligious view-
point."); see also Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1536 (9th Cir. 1985) (Canby,
I., concurring), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1986) ("If the [E]stablishment [C]lause is to
have any meaning, distinctions must be drawn to recognize not simply 'religious' and
'anti-religious, but 'non-religious' governmental activity as well."). Unfortunately, both
judicial decisions and commentators often have confused the nonreligious with the irreli-
gious. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (Douglas, I., dissenting)
("A classification of 'conscience' based on a 'religion' and a 'conscience' based on more
generalized, philosophical grounds is equally invidious by reason of our First Amendment
standards."). This confusion saddles courts with "the illogical task of imposing an impar-
tiality between religious and nonreligious opinion upon a government whose opinions are
supposed to be nothing but nonreligious." Merel, supra note 50, at 813. According to
Merel, the government must maintain neutrality between the religious believer and the
irreligious disbeliever, not between the believer and the indifferent, nonreligious unbeliever.
Id.
52. If one views all value determinations of right and wrong as moral issues and all
morality as emanating from a sacred or divine source, moral relativism - a morality
without absolutes - is not neutral, but hostile to religious doctrine. See John W. White-
head & John Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its
First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 22 (1978) (stating that morality
is a religious concern).
53. Sir Walter Moberly, for example, argues that "nonreligion" is not simply a neutral
position between religion and irreligion. Concerning the religiously "neutral" British um-
versities, he remarked:
[On] the fundamental religious issue the modern university intends to be,
and supposes it is, neutral, but it is not. Certainly, it neither inculcates nor
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If this attack succeeds and we accept (1) that the nonreligious
cannot be distinguished from the irreligious, (2) that education
inevitably involves the teaching of values, (3) that - due to limit-
ed time and resources - teaching Irreligion cannot be balanced by
teaching religion without unconstitutionally discriminating among
religious sects, and yet (4) that promoting irreligious values alone
also is unlawful, the only possible conclusion is that public educa-
tion itself is unconstitutional and should be abolished.5
American society, however, is committed to the tradition of
public eduction and to public schools inculcating values in our
youth.55 Whether we are fully comfortable with it or not, there-
expressly repudiates belief in God. But it does what is far more deadly than
open rejection; it ignores Him.
It is in this sense that the umversity to-day is atheistic It is
a fallacy to suppose that by omitting a subject you teach nothing about it. On
the contrary you teach that it is to be omitted, and it is therefore a matter of
secondary importance. And you teach tlus not openly and explicitly, which
would invite criticism; you simply take it for granted and thereby insinuate it
silently, insidiously, and all but irresistibly.
WALTER MOBERLY, THE CRIsIs IN THE UNIvERSITY 55-56 (1949); see also Smith v.
Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 945 (S.D. Ala.) (relating testimony of witness
objecting to state sponsored teaching of "the religion of humanism" which "denues
the relevancy of God to any decision making or to anything else that is going on
today"), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
54. In fact, echoing John Stuart Mill's willingness to end public education which he
viewed as an effort by government to "establishl a despotism over the mind," JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 205 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 2d ed. 1863), two of our
symposium participants - Professors Michael Paulsen and Richard Myers - voiced in
their oral presentations a sympathy for, if not an acceptance of, the conclusi6n that public
education was unconstitutional. See Richard S. Myers, A Comment on the Death of Lem-
on, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903, 913 (1993) ("If Rabbi Gutterman's prayers are coer-
cive, then the entire cumculum of our public schools must be coercive. There is no way
to eliminate that problem within the existing framework."); Paulsen, supra note 14, at 854
(stating that compulsory public education is coercive, and that the transmission of secular
values in such an environment is unconstitutional to the extent that it undermines a
student's religious beliefs). For sunilar viewpoints, see James Kilpatrick, Does "Religion"
Survive the Classroom?, WASH. STAR, Dec. 1977, at 13 (suggesting public school system
is indistinguishable from an "establishment of religion); Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to
Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686 n.14 (1969) (If public schools support
secularism, the First Amendment requires their abolition.).
55. See Ingber, Religion or Ideology, supra note 43, at 298 & n.400 (noting that
courts regard the "value-instilling process [of education] as highly desirable
precisely because 'it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values.'"
(quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954))). Some commentators argue
that only through the bonds created by commonly held values does society avoid disin-
tegration. See, e.g., PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9-11 (1965). Using
this perspective, others have extolled the importance of public education in instilling the
values and ethics of civic virtue and liberal democracy. See, e.g., ALEmIS DE
TOCQUEvILLE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 208 (Henry S. Commager ed. & Henry Reeve
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fore, we must accept the distinction between the irreligious and the
nonreligious. Nearly a half century ago Justice Robert Jackson
observed that the public school "is organized on the premise that
secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that
the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also
maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion." 6 Although
the premise may at times appear shaky, it is the bedrock of public
education, and none of the children Dent seeks to protect are call-
ing for the closing of public schools. Rather, they are diligently
fighting to retain access.
57
Professor Dent likely would insist that my contention that his
analysis would gut public education is misleading because "[i]n
general free exercise claimants do not seek to invalidate gov-
ernment action, but instead only seek some accommodation for
themselves." 5" This response, however, is inconsistent with his
stated support for the proposition that the "'preservation and trans-
mission of religious beliefs"' are "'committed to the private
sphere"' and are protected from "government interference." 59 His
insistence that this proposition applies as well to Free Exercise as
it does to Establishment Clause claims' and that secularism may
trans., 1947) ("In the United States politics are the end and aim of education Th
Richard L. Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Function of Schooling in
America, 40 HARV. EDUC. REV. 567, 567 (1970) (In order to foster good citizenship,
school curriculum was burdened with "moral instruction and patriotic exercies."); Nadine
Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism" Proposed Standards for Re-
viewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. LJ.
333, 375-76 (1986) (stating that schools may promote broad values thought to be essential
to a democratic constitutional system, such as tolerance of religious differences).
I must confess that my certainty of the American commitment to public education
was shaken by the statements of some of this symposium's participants. See supra note
54. Even Professor Dent, although more cautious, questioned whether there is sufficient
evidence to believe public schools can effectively instill moral values. Dent, supra note 1,
at 735, nn.153-54. Strangely, however, Dent's argument may prove too much. If etlucs
trainung in the schools achieves but limited success in producing the desired attitudes,
beliefs, and dispositions in students, perhaps, as Dent claims, less reason exists to attempt
such a function. To the extent value trainmng falters, however, there is also less reason for
the concern of religious individuals over these attempts. Dent cannot have it both ways. If
schools are sufficiently effective mculcators to justify the apprehension of religious com-
munities, then they also must be at least marginally effective in instilling the values of
good citizenship.
56. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
57. See Dent, supra note 1, at n.30 (citing cases in which students have won
accomodations, such as exemption from classes concerning evolution).
58. Id at 729.
59. Id. at 716 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2656-57 (1992)).
60. Id at 718-19.
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be favored no more than religion 6' renders accommodation an
inappropriate remedy Certainly the prohibition against the state
invading the province of the private sphere and actively participat-
ing in the preservation and transmission of beliefs may not be
circumvented simply by bribing (through accommodation) into
silent acquiescence those otherwise most likely to publicly con-
demn this governmental impropriety This transgression of juris-
dictional boundaries cannot be constitutionally legitimated through
the mechanism of individual waiver.62
If the constitutional violation is as Professor Dent describes,63
accommodation is no more an adequate remedy than is the willing-
ness to excuse a nonbelieving child from participating in a daily
school prayer.' The distinctive remedies for Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause violations65 can be understood only by rec-
61. Id. at 719.
62. For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of waiver, see Seth F. Kreimer,
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1293, 1382-93 (1984).
The case for recognition of waiver rests on the conviction that constitutional rights
are designed solely to secure the interest of personal autonomy by respecting individual
choice. Robert E. Goodin, The Political Theories of Choice and Dignity, 18 AM. PHIL Q.
91, 92, 94 n.19 (1981). But many constitutional rights protect values other than autonomy,
values that are interpersonal or communal in nature. See generally Stanley Ingber, Redis-
covering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional
Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1990) (exploring the importance of free speech in the char-
acter development of a polity). The often used metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas,"
for example, encapsulates the interpersonal value of free speech, resting as much on its
importance to the receiver as to the communicator of any message. See, e.g., Board of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-68 (1982) (emphasizing a student's "'right to receive
information and ideas.'" Id. at 867 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969)). Similarly, the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment
is concerned more with the communal interest of structuring a decent society than with
protecting individual autonomy. Certainly, for a right to be enforced through litigation,
some individual must be privileged to claim it; but such individual may possess that right
only, or at least partially, in an agency or fiduciary capacity. In such circumstances, the
legitimacy of individual waiver is suspect. Had the Supreme Court found the death pen-
alty intrinsically cruel and unusual, I cannot believe a court would sustain a procedure
granting offenders a choice of execution rather than life imipnsonment, regardless of how
strenuously the individual pleaded his preference. Similarly, the "polity principles" stressed
dunng this symposium by Professor Ronald Kahn - paralleling my claim for communal
interests in individual rights - prevent accommodation alone from authonzmg public
trespass upon a domain allegedly dedicated to the private sphere.
63. Dent, supra note 1, at 711.
64. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963) (finding
that even where individual students may be excused upon parental request, compulsory
religious exercises constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause).
65. While the Free Exercise Clause appears satisfied by exempting claimants from pro-
cedures which interfere with their religious practices, Establishment Clause violations de-
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ognizmg the equally distinct prohibitions they embody Th'is, in
turn, is only possible by differentiating between the "religious" and
the "secular." 66
]III. CLAIMS FOR ACCOMMODATION
Even accepting the distinctions I have proposed, arguable
claims for accommodation still may be forthcoming. Parents could
continue to assert the right to insulate their children from nonreli-
gious secular beliefs inconsistent with their religious faith - incon-
sistent, that is, on a level other than that of rejecting the sacred
and divine. Even in this more confined context, however, I find
Professor Dent's analysis incomplete.
First, at times Dent suggests that instruction which "offends" a
child's religious beliefs is a prima facie violation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause;67 at other times he requires that the teaching "in-
fringe" upon those beliefs. 8 This choice of terminology is not
without significance. The entire concept of compulsory education is
based upon the assumption that there are times when the state,
rather than the parent, may decide which perspectives the child
ought to confront.69 Although society normally assumes that par-
ents are best able both to determine and do what is best for their
children,a compulsory education traditionally has been justified as
a mechanism to expose children to ideas that will enable them to
advance beyond the home and transcend the prejudices of the past.7
mand the ternination of offending procedures in their entirety.
66. I may now reassert my belief that, despite his protestations to the contrary, Profes-
sor Dent must be arguing for a value-free or value-neutral education. See supra note 29.
Since he is unwilling to accept a distinction between the religious and the secular (wheth-
er irreligious or nonreligious), reminding us that for some everything is religious, public
school support of any value must be prohibited as an Establishment Clause violation.
67. Dent, supra note 1, at 707, 718, 733.
68. Id. at 711, 725-26.
69. Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 568.
70. See Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention
of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE LJ. 645, 645 (1977) ("To be an adult who is a parent
is to be presumed in law to have the capacity, authority, and responsibility to determine
and to do what is good for one's children.") (emphasis omitted).
71. To compel education, especially education under state control or supervision, is to
assert that the state's perspective as to what is best for children, at times, may prevail
over that of parents. Cf Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-68 (1944) (The state
may forbid child labor even against parents' wishes.). Essentially, the state may determine
that the parent's wishes and the child's interest are incongruent. Upholding present choices
of parents may restrict future options for choice by the child. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 242, 245-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) Justice Douglas noted
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Confronting objectionable ideas in school, therefore, is to be
expected. If such confrontation is simply offensive and disturbing,
religious children have no greater claim to freedom from this dis-
comfort than do children with beliefs based on other founda-
tions.72 The predicament of religious children is unique only when
they feel themselves required or forbidden by a sacred or divine
force to believe or act in a way inconsistent with demands of the
state. Before the religious child has a special claim for differential
treatment, the state's mandate, therefore, must cause "violation" or
"infringement" rather than simply discomfort or offense.73
Professor Dent also would limit Free Exercise claims to in-
fringements that are "substantial," 74 seemingly requiring not mere-
ly de minimis but meaningful conflict with central or core religious
tenets. Although I sympathize with the need for such a qualifier to
avoid trivializing constitutional claims, a requirement that infringe-
that in cases of conflict between parental interests and those of a child in continued pub-
lic education, where the child "is mature enough to have [his choice] respected, the State
may well be able to override the parents' religiously motivated objections," i. at 242,
because a decision regarding public education impacts on the "future of the [child,]
not the future of the parents" and may ,serve to bar the child from the "world of diversi-
ty." Id. at 245. A public education system committed to the value of unrestrained inquiry,
for example, necessarily must counterbalance any value inculcation, by home or church,
that impedes open-minded inquiry. Schools, therefore, may serve simply as a counter-
weight to the more pervasive and restrictive inculcative potential of the family.
72. A long line of case law states that the Religion Clauses do not protect religious
adherents from the discomfort of being confronted by opposing perspectives. See, e.g.,
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590-91 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
107 (1968); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952) ("[The state has
no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to
them "); Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93, 96 (S.D. W. Va. 1975)
c'Mhe First Amendment does not guarantee that nothing offensive to any religion
will be taught in the schools."), aff'd mem., 530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Page,
385 F. Supp. 395, 404 (D.N.H. 1974) (finding that an allegation that school material was
"'distasteful" was inadequate to "invoke the broad mantle of protection afforded by the
First Amendment"). Even under a relatively narrow definition of religion, myriad ideas
essential to scientific, political, and cultural discourse differ from some religious beliefs
and accord with others. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 235-36 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that music, biology, literature, history,
and "nearly everything in our culture which gives meaning to life, is saturated with
religious influences" and that the challenge of teaclung these necessary subjects "with
satisfaction or even with justice to all faiths" is daunting.). Litigation and institutional
chaos could quckly engulf a public school system compelled to excuse students from
classes considering ideas offensive to their religious beliefs.
73. Perhaps prima facie free exercise claims should be limited to instances where stu-
dents are compelled to affim or deny a given belief or to perform or not perform a
specific religious exercise.
74. Dent, supra note 1, at 725-26.
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ments be substantial may well defeat Dent's diligent effort to avoid
the restrictive impact of Employment Division v. Smith75 on de-
mands for accommodation.
Dent emphasizes the Smith Court's willingness to exempt what
it labels "hybrid situation[s]" 76 from a rule upholding all "valid
and neutral law[s] of general applicability" against religious objec-
tions.77 In this context, the Court gives special preference to the
"right of parents to direct the education of their children."7
Cited, seemingly with approval, are such cases as Pierce v. Society
of Sisters7 9 and Wisconsin v. Yoder " From this, Professor Dent
infers that Smith will not preclude Free Exercise claims by students
opposing aspects of public school cumcula.8 '
I view this reference more skeptically - as an effort by the
Court to avoid temporarily the awkwardness of. conflicting prece-
dent as it advances a dramatic revision of Free Exercise Clause
doctrine. Much more essential to the Court's position in Smith is a
belief that it is constitutionally improper for judges to attempt to
evaluate "'the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith."' 82 Yet "hybrid" cases, such as those brought by religious
children seeking accommodation in public schools, are as likely to
require a determination of "centrality" as do any of the so-called
"pure" Free Exercise claims.
Professor Dent insists this problem can be avoided if any
determination of religious centrality is left to the claimant.8 3 Yet
75. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that- the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit ap-
plication of state drug laws to sacramental ingestion of peyote at Native American church-
es).
76. Id. at 882.
77. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)). See Dent,
supra note 1, at 714.
78. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted).
79. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing the right of parents to reject public for private
education).
80. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to
Axush parents who refused, for religious reasons, to send their children to school). See
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
81. Dent, supra note 1, at 713.
82. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Commssioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989)).
83. Dent, supra note 1, at 727. George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular
Schools, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 864, 898-901 (1988). The Supreme Court has based a num-
ber of its decisions on this self-defimng principle. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (stating that it is neither within the Courts function nor compe-
tence to determune whether a given petitioner has 'correctly perceived the conmands
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requiring judges to accept unquestioningly an individual's claim of
centrality would lead to the very anarchy - as each citizen "be-
come[s] a law unto himself" - that Smith is most committed to
avoid.84 Although I am no Smith enthusiast,85 I find Dent's ef-
fort to circumvent its impact unsatisfactory
Finally, even after a valid prima facie Free Exercise claim is
made, Professor Dent properly recognizes that its ultimate success
is partially a function of the degree to which accommodation
would either interfere with significant governmental objectives or
unduly burden the state educational system.86 I also agree that
normally government should be able to conclude ab initio that the
burden is tolerable, that efforts at accommodation should be made,
of [is] faith." ld at 716. Determining that "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation," the Court stated that draft registrants' own characterizations regarding reli-
gious identification should carry great weight. Id); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,
165-66 (1965) (determining that the test of religious belief is whether a given belief is
"sincere and meaningful," occupying a "place in the life of its possessor parallel" to the
place occupied by the Supreme Being in someone who qualified for the statutory religious
exemption to the draft. Id. at 166.); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1944)
(reviewing a reversal of conviction for mail fraud and conspiracy, the Court held that the
district court correctly removed from jury consideration the issue concerning the truth of
petitioners' religious beliefs). The Ballard Court concluded that although "[t]he religious
views espoused by respondents might seem incredible to most people[,]" religious
freedom would perish in an environment in which "one could be sent to jail because a
jury in a hostile environment found those teachings false." I, at 87. But see Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970) (refusing to accept petitioner's characterization of
his beliefs as nonreligious).
84. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1878)). Of course, Professor Dent does not question the Court's ability to evaluate the
sincerity of a religious claim, even if not its verity. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86 (noting
that the First Amendment does not preclude a judicial inquiry into sincerity of a religious
claimants beliefs). However, the questions of verity of belief and sincerity are not severed
easily. Id. at 92-93 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jurors are much more willing to accept that
a given belief is sincerely held if they also perceive it to be reasonably believable. Evalu-
ations of sincerity, therefore, often transform into determinations of religious truth. Never-
theless, questions of fraud must be addressed. For one such effort, see Ingber, Religion or
Ideology, supra note 43, at 292 n.357 (proposing that courts sustain Free Exercise clais
"only if the petitioner agrees to the imposition of some equivalent duty or burden[,]"
thereby discouraging fraudulent claims, nummizing the cost of accomodation, and provid-
ing equal treatment both to those qualifying for a religious exemption and to those
unexempted).
85. Prior to Smith, I always had assumed that the First Amendment embodied a belief
that our society was enhanced by those who exercised their'religious, speech, and press
prerogatives. Following Smith, I find that religion, and perhaps speech and press as well,
are protected merely to the extent that they are treated no more poorly than any other
mundane conduct or enterprise. A liberty concept thus has been transformed into an
equality concept and, to that extent, our polity's character has been diminished.
86. Dent, supra note 1, at 740-41.
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and, thereafter, courts should generally uphold these undertak-
ings.87 However, I am troubled over whether courts should be
able to require an educational system to allow students to remain
in public schools while selectively opting-out of courses, or even
components of courses, these students find religiously objectionable.
Of course, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of parents
who are concerned about religion to remove their children from
public schools totally and have them educated in private institutions
more attuned to family beliefs.8" The ability of a state to accom-
plish its educational goals while accepting the right of students to
opt-out totally from public eduction, however, should not lead to a
like presumption of the efficacy of a partial opt-out system. A
partial opt-out alternative does not disturb state goals less than total
removal; on the contrary, while the latter relieves the public school
system of any accountability for the child's education, partial re-
moval leaves the school system still responsible for and to the
child.89 For example, special curricular and testing devices must
be developed, meticulously avoiding any overlap or integration of
the content of one course with the content of another course from
which students are excused.'
87. Id. at 741. In truth, an invisible voluntary accommodation goes on constantly.
Every time a school system selects a textbook or chooses a subject matter to be taught,
they already may have incorporated into their decisional process a desire not to offend or
violate strongly held beliefs, religious or otherwise, found within the school community.
Although such decisions are essentially acts of accommodation, they often go unnoticed
since the curnculum remains uniform. Voluntary accommodation only becomes visible
when the religious child is exempted from curricular requirements imposed upon other
students.
88. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). One might argue that this total
opt-out alternative sufficiently accommodates the religious parent's interest in a child's up-
bringing. The parent, however, likely would respond that the total opt-out alternative es-
sentially excludes the religious child from any participation in the state program of free
public education. Thus, for the parent, the alternative would appear not as an accommoda-
tion but as an expulsion. But see inf text accompanying notes 89-95.
89. Consequently, the earlier mentioned citation of Pierce and Yoder by the Smith
Court may be of limited significance for the religious child wishing to remain in the
public school. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78. Both cited cases involved the
right of parents to remove children from public schools completely. Professor Dent also
recognuzes tlus factor's potential importance. Dent, supra note 1, at 714.
90. This single illustration could have significant pedagogical impact. Some schools
attempt to encourage an integrated curriculum which requires that ideas appearing in one
course recur in others. This approach to learning, explained one state Director of Elemen-
tary Education, "is well-recognized and enables the students to see learning 'as part of
their total life, not just [as] bits and pieces.'" Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ.,
827 F. 2d 1058, 1072 (6th Cir. 1987) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting witness testimo-
ny) cert dented, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). Such an educational mission would become con-
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Furthermore, judicial decisions requiring schools to accommo-
date partial opt-out requests cannot be limited to a given course,
set of books, or set of students. Such decisions would serve as
precedent for other students and parents claiming religious exemp-
tions.9 The effect could invite disaster, converting the school-
house door into a revolving door as different sects participate in
the public school curriculum in differing degrees.'
Moreover, given the multiplicity of religious sects that exist in
the United States, one should heed Justice Jackson's warning:
If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to
any of these warring sects or inconsistent with any of their
doctrines, we will leave public education in shreds. Nothing
but educational confusion and a discrediting of the public
school system can result from subjecting it to constant law
siderably more difficult - if not impossible - under partial opt-out systems where teach-
ers cannot assume their students have had a common expenence in other courses.
91. Professor Dent misses this point when evaluating the extent of interference with
public eduction objectives caused by accommodation. Dent would have courts consider
only the impact upon the specific educational program from which the child seeks exemp-
tion. See Dent, supra note 1, at 731 (questioning the degree of state concern if religious
children are excused from instruction in AIDS prevention). When religious parents of
vaned sects use litigation to mold their child's public educational experience, public
schools suffer impact not only to isolated programs but to their educational mission gener-
ally. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95.
92. This danger - the core of my concern over religious accommodation in public
schools - only exists when exemptions are sought from an otherwise required curriculum.
All of my comments, therefore, are directed at such demands. Professor Dent, however,
confuses two differing types of exemption petitions. Early in his paper he focuses on
complaints about public school instruction. See Dent, supra note 1, at 708-09 (citing such
objections as the absence of patriotism from "widely used textbooks," the slighting of
"[t]raditional family values," and the depiction of teen sex in an AIDS educational video).
However, at later points he drifts away from conflicts over curricula and introduces reli-
gious concerns over such issues as "the consumption of pork, the covering of one's head,
and the style of one's undergarments." Id. at 727. These latter concerns - of peripheral
significance to the education mission - may be accommodated with numnimal intrusion
upon the fulfillment of educational goals.
Curricular choices, essential to the functioning of any school, cannot be made with-
out the risk of upsetting some religious (or irreligious) groups. See supra text accompany-
mg notes 30-37. Since value inculcation is inevitable, changing the values taught will
merely change the identity of the groups or parties affected. Thus, as long as the values
are taught in nonreligious terms, and no student is compelled to affirm or deny a given
belief or to perform or not perform a specific religious exercise, no "less imposing"
means exists to accomplish the mculcative goal. See supra note 73. On the other hand,
dress codes are optional; schools clearly can function without them. Consequently, in
noncurricular contexts, courts should uphold exemption petitions when the student demon-
strates a conflict with a religious tenet and the state cannot show its regulation to be the
least imposing means to accomplish its nonreligious goal.
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suits.
93
Although Justice Jackson was writing in an Establishment Clause
context, courts interpreting the Free Exercise Clause also must
recognize the complex and fragile nature of our public schools9
and avoid involvement in curricular squabbles unless the consti-
tutional issues are profound.9' Schools cannot avoid instilling val-
ues. Consequently, a student wishing to avoid or only selectively
experience public school curriculum must be satisfied with the op-
tion to transfer to a fully private education system.
IV CONCLUSION
Quite predictably, at this point Professor Dent will remind us
that this option may have little significance for children, or their
parents, who cannot afford private education.' Herein lies the
obvious weakness of my analysis. Consequently, I am sympathetic
to Dent's argument for a voucher system providing public support
for all schools, both public and private.97
This proposal, however, has its own difficulties. First, any
voucher system justified on this basis must make sectarian edu-
cation truly available to the poor rather than merely subsidize
middle-class families that can already afford private schools. Gov-
ernment must also prevent private schools from succumbing to the
economic temptation to simply raise their tuition by the voucher's
value - thereby increasing their revenue without increasing access
to their educational program. The regulatory structure necessary to
accomplish these goals may turn out to be more intrusive than the
sectarian schools are willing to accept; in fact, the level of govern-
93. Illinois ex reL McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1948) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
94. See, e.g., Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1542 (9th Cir. 1985) (Canby,
J., concurring) ("Were the [Firee [E]xercise [C]lause violated whenever governmental activ-
ity is offensive to or at variance with sincerely held religious precepts, virtually no gov-
ernmental program would be constitutionally possible.").
95. For a discussion of the Court's limited competence in resolving curricular issues,
see Ingber, supra note 37, at 50-52 (noting that judges have neither the training to assess
the suitability of various educational materials, nor the "time to evaluate every curricular
change, course book selection, or library purchase." As a result, courts afford deference to
school authorities.).
96. See Dent, supra note 1, at 750 (suggesting that where "expenditures per pupil are
the same," a voucher program does not f~vor religion, but is "neutral in that [it] would
not influence citizens to choose religious schools if they were not already inclined to do
SO").
97. See id. at 750-51.
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ment intrusion into religious education may be such as to itself
create constitutional difficulties.
98
More basically, however, one may question whether public
momes should be requisitioned for a process allegedly constitu-
tionally committed to the "private sphere."' Perhaps the inequity
of the student whose family cannot afford private education is one
better left for private institutions to overcome. 1® But for me, any
effort to solve the problem of religious children confronted by
what they view as an objectionable public school curriculum is
properly located in a debate over the policy and constitutional
propriety of public support for private education.
98. At the time the Bill of Rights was drafted, one line of thought (associated with
Roger Williams, founder of the colony of Rhode Island) supported separation m order to
protect religious institutions from governmental interference. DRAKE UNIV. CONSTITUION-
AL LAW RESOURCE CT., LAW, REuGION AND THE "SECULAR" STATE 12 (Stanley Ingber
ed., 1991). Private schools supporting a voucher system may have accepted a Faustian
bargain: legitimating government regulation as a condition of receiving public funding.
99. See supra text accompanying note 18.
100. If the church becomes sufficiently concerned, conceivably it will furmsh scholar-
ships for needy students desiring sectarian education.
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